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Kademlia is a decentralized overlay network, up to now
mainly used for highly scalable file sharing applications.
Due to its distributed nature, it is free from single points
of failure. Communication can happen over redundant
network paths, which makes information distribution with
Kademlia resilient against failing nodes and attacks. This
makes it applicable to more scenarios than Internet file
sharing. In this paper, we simulate Kademlia networks
with varying parameters and analyze the number of node-
disjoint paths in the network, and thereby the network
connectivity. A high network connectivity is required for
communication and system-wide adaptation even when
some nodes or communication channels fail or get compro-
mised by an attacker. With our results, we show the influ-
ence of these parameters on the connectivity and, there-
fore, the resilience against failing nodes and communica-
tion channels.
1 Introduction
Kademlia [18] is a well known distributed overlay network
which is mainly used for Internet file sharing, e.g., Bit-
Torrent [17]. It has a decentralized structure with re-
dundant communication paths eliminating single points
of failure. This makes it suitable for other research fields,
e.g., the emerging Industry 4.0 context. In Industry 4.0,
distributed Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), consisting of
multiple networked nodes, are expected to improve au-
tomated industrial processes significantly [16]. The net-
worked nodes of a CPS interact with their physical en-
vironment using sensors and actuators, and store infor-
mation about its state and development. Two examples
for distributed CPS are a smart camera network (SCN)
and a network intrusion detection system (IDS). In an
SCN, multiple networked cameras collaborate in surveil-
ing and tracking developments in an observed area. An
IDS secures cooperate networks with several branches by
collaboratively detecting distributed attacks.
A common requirement for all these systems is the abil-
ity to exchange information between nodes. This infor-
mation must be exchanged via communication channels,
which can be either direct or indirect via other nodes.
However, we must consider that nodes or communication
channels might fail. Since some nodes might be publicly
accessible, we must consider that they can fail due to an
attack. To still achieve reliable communication, we require
redundant communication channels for resilient inter-node
communication [12]. More precisely, to tolerate failing
nodes, there must be multiple node-disjoint communica-
tion paths through the network for any node pair. The
minimum number of node-disjoint paths for any node pair
in a network is the network connectivity.
The main contribution of this paper is a thorough evalu-
ation of the connectivity of the Kademlia overlay network,
yielding the resilience of the network against node failures
and disturbed communication channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, we
discuss related research about overlay network connectiv-
ity in Section 2 and present our assumptions in Section 3.
After that, we briefly describe in Section 4 the Kademlia
protocol and the mathematical foundations for comput-
ing the network connectivity. Based on this, we present
and discuss the results of our connectivity measurements
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 6
with a brief summary and provide an outlook on future
research.
2 Related Work
Kademlia and overlay networks in general have been stud-
ied extensively in the scientific literature. A survey about
research on robust peer-to-peer networks from 2006 [21]
already lists several hundred references. Another survey
from 2011 with focus on security aspects, reaches close to
a hundred references [24]. Despite the large amount of
publications in general, the global network connectivity of
Kademlia has not been thoroughly evaluated. We limit
our discussion of related work to literature with relevance
for connectivity of structured overlay networks built with
Kademlia or it’s descendants.
In [15], the authors simulate Kademlia networks and ap-
ply churn (joining/leaving of nodes) to evaluate resilience.
While the basic premise is similar to ours, they measure
response times and number of message hops, not network
connectivity. In [14], the authors insert nodes into a real-
world BitTorrent network. The main focus of this paper
is on connectivity problems within the network caused
by technical obstacles such as firewalls and network ad-
dress translation (NAT). The authors analyze connectiv-
ity properties of small groups of nodes. They do not mea-
sure the network-wide connectivity. Similarly, the authors
of [4] insert nodes into real-world overlay networks built
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by the BitTorrent protocol to measure round trip times
and message rates for resource lookups. Additionally, they
measure “connectivity artifacts” and “communication lo-
cality”. Artifacts emerge from nodes making contact with
the author’s nodes, but cannot be contacted by them.
As in [14], the authors conclude that such a behaviour
is most likely caused by firewalls and NAT. The commu-
nication locality measurements show to what degree nodes
preferably communicate with other nodes that, according
to the protocol’s definition of node distance, are near to
them. While both properties are related to the network
connectivity, it is not measured or derived. The authors of
[23] present a crawling software for capturing connectivity
graphs of networks built by the KAD protocol, a descen-
dant of Kademlia. They insert specially modified crawling
nodes into real-world networks to contact other nodes and
dump the contents of their routing tables. Those tables
are then used to create connectivity graphs of the net-
works. In [22], the same authors characterize the resilience
of those connectivity graphs and of other graphs resulting
from simulations. While their goal is similar to ours, their
approach is of statistical nature and does not calculate the
network connectivity. In [1], the authors propose different
measures to make Kademlia networks more resilient to-
wards malicious nodes. One of those measures is the use
of node-disjoint paths for lookup procedures. The authors
measure success rates for lookup procedures using differ-
ent numbers of disjoint paths. Their simulations imply
that a certain average level of connectivity is present in a
network, but they do not measure the actual connectivity.
In contrast, our main goal is to determine the network
connectivity of Kademlia in dependence of its parameters.
Some of the related work, e.g., [1], even rely on a given
network connectivity, but it was determined neither ana-
lytically nor experimentally before.
3 System Model
We consider a distributed system consisting of multiple
networked nodes. The basic functioning of one node is
not dependent on the functioning of others. The nodes
exchange information for collaboration purposes, depend-
ing on the systems specific purpose and implementation.
Each node is able to communicate with any other node, ei-
ther directly or indirectly via others. The communication
structure is organized by the Kademlia overlay network
(cf. Section 4.1).
We assume the presence of an attacker with the goal of
disturbing, disabling or controlling nodes and communica-
tion channels. We call a node which has been successfully
attacked a compromised node. There are several other
causes exhibiting the same effect as a compromised node,
e.g., maintenance, failures from defects, or other distur-
bances like power outages. Without additional measures,
these are indistinguishable from an attack. If an attacker
has compromised a node, we assume that she is able to
fully impersonate the node towards the rest of the sys-
tem. Therefore, an attacker can disseminate information
into the network as a legitimate part of the system and
also deny requests coming from other nodes and, thus,
hinder or prevent information exchange. Communication
between two nodes is not always direct, so other nodes
can be necessary for message transfer. Additionally, we
assume that the attacker can subvert at most a arbitrary
nodes at any time. With regard to communication chan-
nels, we assume an attacker or other causes can disturb
the channel causing message loss. This leads to a certain
percentage of sent messages not reaching their destination.
4 Connectivity
In this section, first, we present the properties and mech-
anisms of Kademlia important for routing and contact
management. To analyze the network connectivity, we
introduce the mathematical foundations to transfer the
network structure of Kademlia into the domain of graph
theory by creating a connectivity graph. Next, we de-
scribe the mathematical algorithms and necessary graph
transformations for calculating the graph connectivity. Fi-
nally, we use the mathematical foundations to define the
resilience of the communication network.
4.1 Kademlia
With Kademlia, each node and each stored data object is
identified by a numerical id with the fixed bit-length b.
These identifiers are generated from a node’s network ad-
dress or the data object respectively, using a cryptograph-
ically secure hash function with the goal of equal distribu-
tion of identifiers in the identifier space. Each node main-
tains a routing table with identifiers and network addresses
of other nodes, its so-called contacts. The routing table
consists of b so-called k-buckets to store the contacts of the
node. The buckets are indexed from 0 to b−1, and the con-
tacts are distributed into these buckets depending on the
distance of their identifiers id i and the node’s id. For this,
the distance between two identifiers is computed using the
XOR metric, meaning that for two identifiers ida and idb
the distance is dist(ida, idb) = ida⊕ idb, interpreted as an
integer value. The buckets are populated with those con-
tacts id i fulfilling the condition 2
i ≤ dist(id , id i) < 2i+1,
with i being the bucket index. This means that the bucket
with the highest index covers half of the id space, the next
lower bucket a quarter of the id space, and so on. The
maximum number of contacts stored in one bucket is k.
Next to b and k, another defining property of a Kademlia
setup is the request parallelism α, which determines how
many contacts are queried in parallel when a node wants
to either locate another node or retrieve/store a data ob-
ject. Greater values can speed up the operation, while at
the same time increasing the resulting network load. The
staleness limit s determines how often in a row the commu-
nication with a contact must fail, so that it is considered
stale and removed from the routing table. Greater values
of s delay the removal of actually stale nodes by waiting
for more failed communication attempts, while small val-
ues might lead to a frequent removal of non-stale nodes
due to a disturbed communication channel. The Kadem-
lia authors set the default values b = 160, k = 20, α = 3,
and s = 5.
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The nodes of a Kademlia network can locate resources
(other nodes, data objects) by means of their identifiers.
Given a target identifier, a node queries α nodes from its
routing table closest to that identifier. Those, in turn, an-
swer with their own list of closest nodes, which can then
be used in new queries. This way, the requesting node it-
eratively gets closer to the target identifier. This process
ends when a number of k nodes have been successfully
contacted, or no more progress is made in getting closer
to the target identifier. The purpose of a lookup proce-
dure is to locate a node or data object, the purpose of a
dissemination procedure is to locate appropriate nodes for
storing a data object.
4.2 Connectivity Graph
The representation of the network structure as a connec-
tivity graph enables the application of concepts and al-
gorithms from graph theory to analyze properties of the
network. The connectivity graph D(V,E), with the ver-
tices V and edges E, is a directed graph representation of
the nodes and their routing tables. Each vertex from the
connectivity graph represents a distinct node from the net-
work. Hence, the number of vertices equals the number
of network nodes. To construct the connectivity graph,
we add edges the graph according to the routing table of
Kademlia. For each node pair id i, id j represented in the
graph by vertices v and w respectively, we insert the di-
rected edge (v, w) into the set of edges E if and only if
node id j is present in the routing table of id i.
Generally, in network graphs, a capacity value is often
assigned to the edges for expressing the communication
bandwidth between nodes. This is not a necessity for con-
nectivity graphs, since the existence of the edges is enough
to indicate a connection between nodes. However, since it
is necessary for later steps, we assign a capacity of 1 to
each edge.
4.3 Vertex Connectivity for Vertex Pairs
A directed edge in the connectivity graph D(V,E) can
be interpreted as an one-way water pipe. The maximum
amount of water able to flow through the pipe per time
unit is modeled by the edge capacity. The maximum flow
between two vertices v and w is the sum of the capacities
of the minimum edge cut. This is the set of edges with the
smallest total capacity whose removal would cut off any
flow from v to w. In other words, the minimum edge cut
is the bottle neck which determines the maximum possible
flow v to w.
Analog to the minimum edge cut for two vertices v and
w, the minimum vertex cut is the minimum number of ver-
tices whose removal cuts all paths from v to w. The order
of the minimum vertex cut is called the vertex connectivity
from v to w, i.e., κ(v, w). Menger’s theorem for directed
graphs states that for the two non-adjacent vertices v and
w the vertex connectivity is equal to the maximum num-
ber of pairwise vertex-disjoint paths from v to w [19, 2].
This number correlates directly with the communication
resilience (cf. Section 4.5). Therefore, to evaluate the re-
silience, we need to calculate the vertex connectivity.
There are multiple algorithms to compute the maxi-
mum flow/minimum edge cut between any two vertices
in a graph. However, in general, the vertex connectivity
does not correspond to the maximum flow/minimum edge
cut. To bridge the gap from computing the maximum
flow/minimum edge cut to computing the vertex connec-
tivity, we apply Even’s algorithm (e.g., [5, 6, 7, 8]). It
transforms the connectivity graph D(V,E) such that the
maximum flow between two non-adjacent vertices is equal
to their vertex connectivity. This allows the application
of maximum flow algorithms to calculate the vertex con-
nectivity. Even’s graph transformation is applied on the
original connectivity graph D(V,E) consisting of n ver-
tices and m edges. We assume that D(V,E) has neither
self-loops nor parallel edges. The problem transformation
is done by applying the following steps to each vertex of
D(V,E):
• Let v be a vertex of the directed graph D(V,E) with
the incoming degree of din,v and outgoing degree of
dout,v.
• Split v into the two vertices v′ (incoming vertex) and
v′′ (outgoing vertex).
• All incoming edges of v point to v′, so that it has the
incoming degree din,v.
• Make all outgoing edges of v originate from v′′, so
that it has the outgoing degree dout,v.
• Insert the edge (v′, v′′) with capacity 1. Now the out-
going degree of v′ and the incoming degree of v′′ are
1.
The resulting graphD′(V ′, E′) has 2n vertices andm+n
edges and can be used to calculate the vertex connectivity
by applying a max flow algorithm. An example for such a
graph transformation is shown in Figure 1.
4.4 Vertex Connectivity for Graphs
The vertex connectivity of a graph D(V,E) is the min-
imum of the vertex connectivities of all pairs of distinct
non-adjacent vertices in the graph, i.e.,
κ(D) = min(κ(v, w)) : v 6= w∧ (v, w) /∈ E ∧v, w ∈ V. (1)
If D(V,E) is not a complete graph, we determine the ver-
tex connectivity κ(v, w) for a pair of non-adjacent ver-
tices v and w by computing the maximum flow from out-
going vertex v′′ to the incoming vertex w′ in the trans-
formed graph D′(V ′, E′). Therefore, the vertex connectiv-
ity κ(D) for the whole graph can be determined by finding
the minimum of the maximum flows between all pairs of
outgoing and incoming vertices in the transformed graph
D′(V ′, E′). If D(V,E) is complete, meaning that any ver-
tex is adjacent to any other vertex, the vertex connectivity
is the number of vertices in the graph n minus one [2].
To find the minimum of the maximum flows for a trans-
formed directed graph D′(V ′, E′) with 2n vertices, it is
generally necessary to compute the maximum flow for all
n(n−1) distinct pairs of outgoing/incoming vertices. This
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(b) Transformed Network Graph D′.
Figure 1: Example transformation for Even’s algorithm.
From vertex a to vertex i, the connectivity graph
in (a) shows a maximum flow of 3 and a vertex
connectivity κ(a, i) = 1. For a′′ and i′ in the
transformed graph D′ in (b), the maximum flow
equals the vertex connectivity of 1.
makes the time complexity in terms of maximum flow com-
putations O(n2). To find the minimum of the maximum
flows for a transformed undirected graph G′(V ′, E′) with
2n vertices, it is sufficient to compute the maximum flow
for n− 1 distinct pairs of outgoing/incoming vertices [11].
This makes the time complexity in terms of maximum flow
computations O(n).
4.5 Resilience
We call a network that can function properly even when a
number of r nodes have been compromised an r-resilient
network. This means that with up to r compromised
nodes a path still exists between any pair of nodes. As
stated in our system model (cf. Section 3), we assume that
an attacker is able to compromise a number of a nodes.
We require that information exchange in the network is
still possible even under this condition. Hence, to tolerate
those a compromised nodes, we need an r-resilient network
with r ≥ a. This is fulfilled when the connectivity κ(D)
is greater than the necessary resilience, i.e., κ(D) > r.
Since each compromised node can disconnect at most one
of the κ(D) node-disjoint paths (cf. Section 4), there is
still at least one path remaining. The correlation between
the graph connectivity, the resilience and the number of
attackers is summarized in Equation 2.
κ(D) > r ≥ a (2)
From this equation, one can determine (1) the resilience
of a given network as r = κ(D) − 1 and (2) the required
connectivity of a network for a specific a as κ(D) > a.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we first describe our simulation environ-
ment, i.e., the tools used to determine the network con-
nectivity. After that, we present our evaluation methodol-
ogy and the simulation scenarios. Finally, we present the
achieved results and discuss them.
5.1 Environment
For our simulations, we use the network simulation soft-
ware PeerSim [20]. It is implemented with the Java pro-
gramming language and includes an event protocol class
for event driven simulations. We added Kademlia as an in-
stance of this “EDProtocol”. Additionally we wrote soft-
ware components to provide functionality for creating net-
work churn (addition and removal of nodes) as well as re-
questing data objects and disseminating information into
the network.
For the graph transformation, we implemented Even’s
algorithm in Java. To calculate the maximum flow be-
tween a pair of vertices, we use the software “HIPR” [10].
It is a C implementation of the hi-level variant of the push-
relabel algorithm presented in [3]. In its original form,
HIPR only calculates the maximum flow for one vertex
pair. Therefore, we modified it to support calculations
with multiple vertex pairs per program invocation. As
adjacent vertex pairs do not influence the graph connec-
tivity in our context (cf. 4.3), we also added program logic
to detect such pairs. We further wrote multiple software
tools and scripts for both generation of maximum flow
computing tasks, and validation and aggregation of the
output created from these tasks.
We ran our simulations on a dual socket system with
Intel Xeon E5-2690 CPUs (2.6 GHz), each with 14 cores
plus hyper-threading. For the maximum flow computa-
tions, we used a Linux cluster provided by our University.
We distributed the computations to 24 cluster nodes, each
providing two 16 core AMD Opteron 6276 CPUs (2.3 GHz)
with hyper-threading.
5.2 Methodology
To calculate the graph connectivity over time, we persist
the connectivity graph of a network at pre-defined time
stamps in a simulation. For that purpose, we interrupt
the simulation and save the current contents of the rout-
ing tables of all network nodes to disk into a snapshot file.
We use this snapshot file to transform the connectivity
graph with Even’s algorithm. Next, we convert the trans-
formed graph to the supported input format of HIPR (i.e.,
DIMACS [9]) to calculate the maximum flow.
The push-relabel algorithm used for the maximum flow
computation for a single vertex pair in HIPR has a worst
case time complexity of O(n2√m), where n is the number
of vertices and m the number of edges in the processed
graph [3]. Since the transformed graph D′(V ′, E′) con-
tains 2n nodes and n+m edges, the complexity of calcu-
lating the maximum flow of a single vertex pair in D′ is
O(n2√n+m). To calculate the graph connectivity κ(D′),
we need to apply the above calculation on the transformed
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graph from all outgoing vertices to all incoming vertices,
i.e., n(n − 1) times. Thus, the overall time complexity
for calculating κ(D′) is O(n4√n+m). This complexity
makes the maximum flow computation very expensive.
For instance, the full maximum flow computation for a
transformed connectivity graph with 2500 vertices takes
about 250 hours on a single CPU core.
The nodes in Kademlia attempt to add each other to
their respective routing tables. This would result in an
undirected connectivity graph. However, due to size re-
strictions of the buckets in the routing table and race con-
ditions, these attempts are not always successful. Hence,
there is no guarantee for the connectivity graph being
undirected. Nevertheless, our analysis of simulation runs
shows that the connectivity graphs come very close to be-
ing undirected. This allows us to reduce the amount of
maximum flow computations from n(n− 1) to c ·n(n− 1),
0 < c ≤ 1. We achieve this reduction by only using a
percentage c ·n of outgoing vertices for the maximum flow
calculation. Since the outgoing degree dout,v of a vertex
v is an upper limit for the outgoing flow, we select those
c · n outgoing vertices with the smallest dout . As we cal-
culate the maximum flow from only a percentage c · n of
outgoing vertices to all n − 1 incoming vertices, also the
limiting incoming degree din is still considered. We ver-
ified this with 20 randomly selected connectivity graphs,
for which we performed a full analysis, i.e., calculated the
maximum flow for all n(n − 1) vertex pairs. In all cases,
c = 0.02 (2%) was sufficient to determine the minimum of
the maximum flows, i.e., the graphs vertex connectivity.
5.3 Scenarios
In a two page short paper [13], we briefly presented some
shorter simulations done with an earlier version of our
simulator, varying a single Kademlia parameter, namely
k. Based on these, we have made several improvements.
Previously, we investigated three different mechanisms for
node bootstrapping, which turned out to show no signif-
icant differences with regard to connectivity. Therefore,
we now apply only one bootstrap mechanism, in which the
bootstrap nodes are completely random, and any node can
be affected by churn. Also, to bring the simulations closer
to a real world scenario, actions affecting the network
structure, e.g., lookup procedures and node removals, are
done at random points in time within a predetermined
time frame. As a result, the initial bootstrap procedure to
create the network is done randomly in terms of time and
bootstrap node selection. A new node joins the network
at a random point in the simulated time that is evenly dis-
tributed between 0 and 30 minutes. The bootstrap node
is randomly chosen from the already joined nodes.
Beyond that we extended the number of varied Kadem-
lia parameters in our simulations from one to four and also
added scenarios with communication channels affected by
message loss. To determine how different environments
and protocol parameters influence the connectivity of the
network, we devised a total eight dimensions for the simu-
lations, i.e., network size, network churn, network traffic,
message loss, the Kademlia bucket size k, the parallelism
factor α, the bit-length b, and the staleness limit s.
Network Size
We consider two different scenarios for the network size,
i.e., a small network with 250 nodes and a large one with
2500 nodes. Our choice for these network sizes is based on
the CPS examples introduced in Section 1. For the smart
camera scenario, a large number of smart cameras may
be necessary for reliably observing and controlling an in-
dustrial complex. Thus, we simulate it with 250 nodes. In
contrast, a distributed IDS can be used for securing corpo-
rate networks spanning several branches. Such networks
usually comprise several hundreds to thousands of nodes.
Exemplarily, we choose 2500 nodes for this scenario.
Network Churn
We consider three different churn scenarios. In the sce-
nario (0/1), we remove a single node from the network in
every minute of simulated time and add no nodes. In the
scenario (1/1), we add one node and remove one node ev-
ery minute. Similarly, in the scenario (10/10), we remove
ten nodes and add ten nodes per minute. The add/remove
actions happen at random points in time within each
minute range. We chose these high churn rates to to get
a clear indication of effects related to churn in our simu-
lations.
Network Traffic
We distinguish two different scenarios with respect to data
traffic, i.e., with and without data traffic. In the scenario
with data traffic, all nodes regularly look up data ob-
jects and disseminate them. For this, each node performs
10 lookup procedures an 1 dissemination procedure per
minute during the whole simulation. The procedures hap-
pen at random points in time within each minute range. In
the scenario without data traffic, the nodes do not lookup
data objects or disseminate them. However, for mainte-
nance purposes Kademlia requires each node to perform
a so-called “bucket-refresh” every 60 minutes. For this,
a node randomly generates an id from the id range of
each k-bucket and performs lookup procedures for these
ids. This way, it can learn about previously unknown con-
tacts and stale contacts in its routing table. Hence, even
in the scenario without data traffic, there is some basic
maintenance traffic.
Message Loss
Since two-way communication in the form of re-
quest/response is the most used communication type in
Kademlia, we tailor our message loss l towards it. We
apply four different message loss scenarios with different
probabilities for a two-way communication to fail. Those
probabilities apply to any communication taking place be-
tween nodes. The first scenario, none, has no loss at all,
all messages reach their destination. Unless marked oth-
erwise, this is the default case. The three other scenarios
are low, medium and high. Table 1 shows the loss prob-
abilities for one-way and two-way communication for all
four scenarios.
5
Loss l Ploss(1-way) Ploss(2-way)
none 0.0% 0%
low 2.5% 5%
medium 13.4% 25%
high 29.3% 50%
Table 1: Message loss scenarios with loss probabilities for
one way and two way communication.
Kademlia Bucket Size
In Kademlia, the bucket size k is directly responsible for
the number of contacts a node can keep in its routing
table. To determine its effect on the network connectivity,
we use four different values for k, i.e., k ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30}.
Kademlia Request Parallelism
The request parallelism α determines how many queries
are made in parallel when locating a node or data object.
We use the values 3 and 5 for α.
Kademlia Staleness Limit
The staleness limit s is the number of unsuccessful com-
munication attempts in a row that lead to the removal of
a contact from the routing table, assuming it has left the
network. We use the values 1 and 5 for s. In simulations
with churn, which are not specifically meant for evaluat-
ing s and have the loss scenario none, we set s = 1. This
allows quick reaction to nodes leaving the network and,
therefore, provides a clearer picture on the influence of
churn.
Kademlia Bit-length
The bit-length b is the size of the numerical identifier of a
node or data object in bits. We use the values 160 and 80
for b.
In summary, we have eight dimensions with several sce-
narios for each of them, i.e., 1536 combinations. We sim-
ulated a majority of these combinations to determine how
the dimension and the connectivity correlate and present
our results in the next section.
5.4 Simulation Phases
In all simulations the network is fully setup after 30 min-
utes (setup phase), as described in detail above. From
minute 30 to minute 120 (stabilization phase), we allow
the network to stabilize. These 90 minutes guarantee that
for scenarios without data traffic each node performs a
bucket refresh. After that, starting at minute 120, we
apply a churn scenario, if the simulation requires churn
(churn phase).
5.5 Results for Traffic, Churn, and Bucket
Size k
In this section, we present the simulations and measure-
ment results for different network scenarios. The first four
simulations focus on the effect of traffic, while the remain-
ing simulations focus on the effect of churn. In each graph,
we present the simulations for all four bucket sizes.
5.5.1 Without data traffic
In Simulations A & B, no data traffic is present. The
churn scenario is 0/1. We present the simulation for the
network size 250 in Figure 2 and the simulation for the
network size 2500 in Figure 3.
After the setup phase, the connectivity for k ∈ {20, 30}
is at roughly k for both network sizes. For k = 10, this is
also true for the small network, whereas the connectivity
is zero in the large network. For k = 5, the connectivity
is zero in both networks. For the smaller k values, the
setup appears to be more problematic the bigger the net-
work. Further investigation showed, that this is caused
by a single digit number of disconnected nodes. While
those nodes do not have significantly less entries in their
own routing table than others, they themselves only ap-
pear in the routing tables of less than k other nodes or
none at all. This issue is resolved during the stabilization
phase for k = 10, so that the connectivity is roughly k
for k ∈ {10, 20, 30}. In the churn phase, the minimum
connectivity first increases overall for all k values. This
effect also applies to k = 5, so that now the minimum
connectivity for the smallest k value rises to k and above.
With continuing churn and decreasing network size, the
minimum connectivity drops again.
It appears that the network state after stabilization is
not ideal from a connectivity point of view. The leaving
nodes enable the network to reconfigure (freed up entries
in the k-buckets) towards a higher connectivity. This con-
tinues until the network size becomes too small to sustain
this behavior.
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Figure 2: Simulation A, Size 250, churn 0/1, without data
traffic
5.5.2 With data traffic
In Simulations C & D, data traffic is present. The churn
scenario is 0/1. We present the simulation for the network
size 250 in Figure 4 and the simulation for the network size
2500 in Figure 5.
The setup phase is similar to that in Simulations A & B.
At its end, the connectivity for k ∈ {20, 30} is at roughly
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Figure 3: Simulation B, Size 2500, churn 0/1, without data
traffic
k for both network sizes. For k = 10, this is also true for
the small network, whereas the connectivity is zero in the
large network. For k = 5, the connectivity is zero for both
network sizes. For the smaller k values, the setup again
appears to be more problematic the bigger the network.
The cause are, as before, a single digit number of discon-
nected nodes, which do not appear in the routing tables
of other nodes. This issue is resolved during the stabiliza-
tion phase for all four k values, so that the connectivity is
roughly k. In the churn phase, the minimum connectiv-
ity first increases overall for all k values. With continuing
churn and decreasing network size, the minimum connec-
tivity drops again.
Compared to Simulations A & B, the observed effects
are similar, but their timing and strength are different.
Connectivity values of k or above are reached earlier in the
simulations. The increase in minimum connectivity with
churn is much more pronounced and its maximum values
are also greater. Towards the end of the simulation, with
10 nodes left in the network, the network is now fully
connected for each bucket size except the smallest one.
As one would expect, the data traffic results in an overall
improved connectivity.
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Figure 4: Simulation C, Size 250, churn 0/1, with data
traffic
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Figure 5: Simulation D, Size 2500, churn 0/1, with data
traffic
5.5.3 With 1/1 churn
In Simulations E & F, data traffic is present. The churn
scenario is 1/1. We present the simulation for the network
size 250 in Figure 6 and the simulation for the network size
2500 in Figure 7.
As this is a simulation with data traffic, the setup phase
and stabilization phase are similar to those in Simulations
C & D. An exception here is the large network with k = 5.
Its minimum connectivity does not quite reach k at the end
of the stabilization phase, but is none the less greater than
zero.
Whereas, similar to the 0/1 churn, the average connec-
tivity benefits from the churn phase, the minimum con-
nectivity does not. For the greater values of k the min-
imum connectivity oscillates around k, for smaller values
it drops significantly, even down to 0. This effect is more
pronounced in the larger network, where for k = 5 the
minimum connectivity is 0 throughout almost the whole
churn phase.
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Figure 6: Simulation E, Size 250, churn 1/1, with data
traffic
5.5.4 With 10/10 churn
In Simulations G & H, data traffic is present. The churn
scenario is 10/10. We present the simulation for the net-
work size 250 in Figure 8 and the simulation for the net-
work size 2500 in Figure 9.
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Figure 7: Simulation F, Size 2500, churn 1/1, with data
traffic
The setup phase and stabilization phase are basically
identical to those in Simulations C & D.
With the increased churn, the average connectivity
reaches the same levels as with simulations E & F, but rises
much faster as soon as the churn sets in. For the minimum
connectivity the differences are more significant. Where
the absolute values allow it, the oscillation increases. The
overall level drops for all k values, so that e.g. the mini-
mum connectivity for k = 5 is now almost always at 0 also
for the small network.
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Figure 8: Simulation G, Size 250, churn 10/10, with data
traffic
5.5.5 Relative Variance for Churn
A numerical comparison of the 1/1 and 10/10 churn sce-
narios is given in Table 2. It shows the means and the Rel-
ative Variance (RV), i.e., Variance/Mean, of the minimum
connectivity during the churn phase for the simulations
E to H for all four k values. From the graphs our impres-
sion was that increased churn leads to increased variance
relative to the connectivity. We, therefore, calculated the
RV to express the effects of increased churn. As the RV
values in Table 2 show, the increase in churn from 1/1 to
10/10 leads to an increased RV in all simulations. The
exception is the network size 2500 with k = 5, where the
minimum connectivity is zero throughout the whole churn
phase for both churn scenarios.
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Figure 9: Simulation H, Size 2500, churn 10/10, with data
traffic
Size k Churn Mean RV
250
5
1/1 3.49 0.63
10/10 1.93 0.75
10
1/1 10.12 0.17
10/10 9.22 0.23
20
1/1 22.22 0.36
10/10 20.53 0.39
30
1/1 32.84 0.34
10/10 32.78 0.62
2500
5
1/1 0.00 0.00
10/10 0.00 0.00
10
1/1 9.30 0.13
10/10 7.38 0.21
20
1/1 22.06 0.07
10/10 16.62 0.16
30
1/1 31.35 0.10
10/10 25.73 0.24
Table 2: Simulations E to H: Means and Relative Variance
(RV)
5.6 Results for Request Parallelism α
Figures 10a and 10b show the means of the minimum con-
nectivity during churn for all four k values for simulations
E to H (see Table 2) and for additional simulations. For
simulations E to H the request parallelism α equals 3.
The additional simulations have the same scenarios as G
(small network, churn 10/10) and H (large network, churn
10/10), except now α equals 5. The figures show the fol-
lowing: 1) The scenarios with churn 1/1 show a higher
connectivity than those with churn 10/10. This is more
prominent in the large network, than in the small one. 2)
For k = 5 the connectivity is zero for all scenarios of the
large network and for churn 10/10 with α = 5 in the small
network. Therefore, k ≥ 10 seems to be the minimum
advised k for a connected network. 3) The increase of α
from 3 to 5 with churn 10/10 has a very negative impact
on connectivity for the smaller k values. The connectivity
for k = 5 is zero for both network sizes and almost zero
for k = 10 in the large network. This is possibly due to
the fact that a node contacts more other nodes in parallel
and, therefore, takes places in more routing tables. Those
8
places are not available for joining nodes, so that for small
k a disconnected node is very likely.
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Figure 10: Means of the minimum connectivity during
churn
5.7 Results for Bit-length b
In other simulations we used the the same scenarios as in
C and D, except for the identifier size b, which changed
from 160 to 80. They showed no significant difference from
C and D with regard to connectivity.
5.8 Message Loss and Staleness Limit s
In this section we present results from simulations with
focus on message loss and the staleness limit s. The fol-
lowing settings apply to all shown simulations: Data traffic
is present, the bucket size k is 20, and the bit-length b is
160. Since the observed effects are very similar for both
network sizes, we present the results for the large network
only.
5.8.1 Staleness Limits without Message Loss
Simulation I shows the effect of the two different stale-
ness limits s ∈ {1, 5} in a network affected by churn and
without message loss (l=none). We present the simulation
for churn 1/1 in Figure 11a and the simulation for churn
10/10 in Figure 11b. With churn 1/1, there is no signif-
icant difference between the two staleness limits. With
churn 10/10, the average connectivity for s=5 drops be-
low that of s=1, as soon as the churn phase begins. It re-
mains that way for the remainder of the simulation. Three
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Figure 11: Simulation I, no message loss, s ∈ {1, 5}
effects are responsible for this: 1) With the stronger net-
work churn more nodes become stale per minute, resulting
in more stale routing table entries. 2) The stronger churn
also results in more nodes joining per minute, each of them
needing to become connected. 3) With the greater stale-
ness limit it takes all nodes longer to detect and remove
stale entries in their routing tables. Since the routing ta-
ble size is limited and each stale entry potentially keeps a
new contact from entering the routing table, the average
connectivity decreases. Interestingly, the minimum con-
nectivity is not affected. It is the same for s=1 as for s=5.
At the moment we don’t know the reason for this, but we
will investigate this issue further.
5.8.2 Staleness Limit with Message Loss
The simulations J, K and L show the effect of the three
message loss scenarios l ∈ {low,medium, high} on the
network connectivity, together with both staleness lim-
its s ∈ {1, 5}, and three different churn scenarios. Mes-
sage loss is present throughout all three simulation phases,
setup, stabilization, and churn.
Simulation J has no churn. We present the measure-
ments for this simulation in Figure 12. The connectivity
during the setup phase is very poor for all loss scenarios
and staleness limit values. Nodes are not able to achieve
connectivity immediately on joining the network. For s=1
the network shows a quick increase in minimum connec-
tivity immediately after the setup phase. The minimum
connectivity reaches values between 80 and 110, far greater
than the bucket size k=20. For our three loss scenarios,
higher message loss results in higher connectivity. A sim-
ilar behavior is visible in simulations A to D with churn
0/1, where nodes leave the network but no new nodes join.
In both cases communication attempts can fail, in simu-
lation J due to message loss, in simulations A to D due
to stale nodes. This leads to the removal of contacts from
the routing tables, making room for other contacts. These
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Figure 12: Simulation J, with message loss l, s ∈ {1, 5}, no
churn
results again show, that the structure of a Kademlia net-
work is not ideal regarding connectivity after the network
setup or node joins in general. For s=5 any structure
change due to message loss is much less pronounced than
with s=1, since now a contact is removed from a rout-
ing table only after five failing communication attempts
in a row, not just one. The greater staleness limit has a
damping effect on both the absolute connectivity and its
variance. Any increase in minimum and average connec-
tivity happens far slower, and the resulting connectivity
is lower. This is especially the case with loss scenarios
medium and low. Here, both minimum and average con-
nectivity show a severe decrease compared to s=1. For
low loss, the positive effect of message loss on minimum
connectivity is hardly visible, as the connectivity remains
just slightly above k=20.
We want to remark that, despite its positive effect on
connectivity, message loss has of course negative impact
on other network aspects, e.g. the latency or result qual-
ity of lookup procedures. Here, as described in Section
4.1, the termination criterion is either a number of k suc-
cessfully contacted nodes or a lack of progress. Message
loss can increase the lookup latency, since more communi-
cation attempts can be necessary to reach k successfully
contacted nodes. Also, progress may stop earlier because
furthering information never reaches the node performing
the lookup.
In simulation K the churn scenario is 1/1. We show the
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Figure 13: Simulation K, with message loss l, s ∈ {1, 5},
churn 1/1
results in Figure 13. For s=1 the different loss scenarios on
average still result in different levels of minimum connec-
tivity during the churn phase. However, the churn visibly
reduces the positive effect of message loss, as those con-
nectivity levels are significantly lower than without churn.
Like in simulation J, a damping effect on connectivity is
visible with s=5. Combined with the churn, it limits the
minimum connectivity to about k for all loss scenarios.
Also, the minimum connectivity drops far below k and
even down to zero multiple times in the simulation with
both staleness limits. This is due to a small number of
nodes not being able to establish connectivity right away
in the bootstrap process.
In simulation L the churn scenario is 10/10. We show
the results in Figure 14. The stronger churn counters the
positive effects of message loss even more, so that now
also the average connectivity is affected. Furthermore,
the drops in connectivity due to bootstrap problems are
much more frequent. With the added damping effect from
s=5, the minimum connectivity stays below k at all times
during the churn phase.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed the connectivity of the overlay
network Kademlia in multiple simulated scenarios. We
conclude several results from our work. The network con-
nectivity κ of Kademlia strongly correlates with the bucket
10
0500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
N
et
w
o
rk
 s
iz
e
C
o
n
n
e
ct
iv
it
y
Time (min)
Avg (l=low) Min (l=low) Avg (l=med) Min (l=med)
Avg (l=high) Min (l=high) Network size
(a) Staleness limit s=1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
N
et
w
o
rk
 s
iz
e
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
vi
ty
Time (min)
Avg (l=low) Min (l=low) Avg (l=med) Min (l=med)
Avg (l=high) Min (l=high) Network size
(b) Staleness limit s=5
Figure 14: Simulation L, with message loss l, s ∈ {1, 5},
churn 10/10
size k. To achieve a certain resilience level r for an overlay
network, we require a network connectivity κ > r. With
our results, we determined that the bucket size needs to
be set to a value greater than r, i.e., k > r. Nevertheless,
especially for scenarios with strong churn, the resilience
level cannot be guaranteed. In situations with no or few
nodes joining the network, the network connectivity was
equal or greater than k. The presence of network traffic
greatly enhances the network connectivity, both in terms
of absolute connectivity and the time to reach this connec-
tivity. The effect of 1/1 and 10/10 churn on the network
connectivity is ambivalent. While it can even have a posi-
tive effect on the average connectivity, the minimum con-
nectivity drops significantly below k with stronger churn
and shows greater variance relative to its mean. The stal-
eness limit s also has ambivalent effects. While a greater
value reduces connectivity variance, it also reduces the
overall connectivity level. Message loss, though generally
an undesired property in networks, actually increases the
Kademlia network connectivity.
Future work will include investigation of the effects of
message loss on the network connectivity. The goal is the
development of mechanisms that provide similar connec-
tivity improvements, while avoiding the negative effects of
loss. We further plan to extend Kademlia to improve upon
the minimum connectivity in all cases and to introduce a
parameter to control its connectivity independently of the
bucket size.
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